WordPress 7.1.5: 20 security fixes, and four need no login
WordPress 7.1.5 came out on November 18, 2026, three weeks to the day after 7.1.4. It's another security release, and WordPress's advice hasn't changed: update immediately.
There are 20 fixes this time. WordPress labels four of them unauthenticated, which means the attacker doesn't need an account on your site. One of those four can lead to remote code execution, so that's where we'd start reading.
The better news: every branch back to 4.7 has its own patched version, and all of them were out within three hours. If you only want to know which version you need, skip to the table.
What shipped
The release was led by Jeremy Felt, Jerry Jones and Jarda Snajdr. Most of it is one commit to WordPress's PHP code: 15 changes that add about 600 lines and remove about 80 across 17 files. The other five changes are in the block editor and come from the separate Gutenberg repository.
The announcement and the version documentation agree this time, which they didn't for 7.1.4. Both list the same 20 items. WordPress describes two of them as hardening, but its branch table counts all 20 as vulnerabilities, so we do too.
Six were found by WordPress's own security team and two by Anthropic. The rest came from outside researchers, and we've named each one below.
When we checked on November 19, none of the 20 had a CVE or a GitHub security advisory. For 7.1.4 the advisories appeared the day after the release, still without CVE numbers. So don't wait for a severity score. What an attacker needs to have first tells you more.
No account needed
Template Part block: privilege escalation that could lead to remote code execution
Reported by Logan Homolka. That heading is close to everything WordPress has said about it, so here's what the patch shows.
A Template Part block points at a template part, like your header or footer, by a theme name and a slug. Both are stored in the block's attributes. When the block editor loads the block, it uses that pair as part of the address of a REST API request. Until now it didn't check what was in there.
The fix makes the editor refuse any identifier containing characters that change what an address means: ?, #, &, backslashes, control characters and ../ segments, plus the percent-encoded versions of each.
We think that shows the shape of it. A crafted block could redirect a request the editor makes, and the editor makes it as whoever is logged in and looking at the page. If that's an Administrator, the request carries an Administrator's permissions. WordPress hasn't said how someone without an account gets the block in front of an Administrator, and we're not going to guess.
Stored cross-site scripting through shortcodes in comments
Reported by Rafie Muhammad of Awesome Motive. Shortcode attributes can contain escape sequences, and WordPress decoded them when it read the shortcode. \x3c, for example, decodes to <. So a comment could pass WordPress's HTML filtering as plain text and turn into markup afterwards.
Now, an escape sequence that decodes to <, > or a quote mark comes out as a harmless character reference instead.
WordPress doesn't run shortcodes in comments by default. As far as we can tell, this one needs a theme or plugin that switches that on.
Private taxonomy terms through REST API search
Reported by Anthropic. The REST API's search endpoint can search terms, meaning categories, tags and custom taxonomies. If a search ended up with no taxonomy to look in, WordPress searched all of them, including ones registered as private. It now returns nothing.
This matters if you or a plugin keep internal labels in a private taxonomy.
Denial of service through batched pingbacks
Reported by Giovanni Cintolo. XML-RPC lets a client bundle many calls into one request. Every pingback makes your site do database and network work, so a single request stuffed with pingbacks could tie up a server. WordPress now handles one pingback per request and rejects the others before doing anything.
A Subscriber account
Comments on posts you can't see
Reported by Jaewook Lee. Over XML-RPC, wp.getComments let any logged-in user list approved comments, including comments on posts they had no right to read. Each one came back with the commenter's email and IP address.
It now returns only comments on posts the user can read. Email and IP addresses go only to people who can moderate or edit the comment. If your site has open registration, this is the fix that matters most to you after the four above.
A Contributor account
Contributors write drafts and someone more senior reviews them. Each of these runs script in the reviewer's browser.
- Scripts in embed responses. Reported by vvh1te3zz. The editor fetches embed previews through a proxy on your own site. That proxy passed along any scripts an outside provider's response included. It now strips them.
- The Comment Date block's format. Reported by Weston Ruter and Jeremy Felt. The block lets you set a date format, and a date format can include literal text. That text went onto the page unescaped. It's escaped now.
- Filenames when converting to a File block. Reported by CryptoFox. When you convert a media block to a File block, the filename becomes the link text. A crafted filename was treated as markup in the editor. It's escaped now.
An Author account
- Email addresses through the REST API. Reported by Ben Bidner. An Author could reassign a comment they were allowed to edit to another user. WordPress then copied that user's email address onto the comment and sent it back in the response. Reassigning now needs permission to moderate comments, and the new author has to belong to the site.
- Moving comments in the admin. Reported by Jesse McNeil. The Edit Comment screen accepted a different post ID without checking it. Someone who could edit a comment on their own post could attach it to any post, including posts they couldn't read. WordPress now checks the destination, and the comment's type can't be changed from that screen.
An Editor account
Reported by Jarda Snajdr. When an Editor set the author of a post or template through the REST API, WordPress only checked that the user existed. It now checks that the user belongs to the site. On a single site every user does, so we think this is mainly a fix for multisite networks.
An Administrator account
- Stored cross-site scripting through Customizer previews. Reported by Weston Ruter. When you save a setting, WordPress cleans the value first. Values being previewed in the Customizer skipped that step. They're now cleaned the same way. On a single site an Administrator can already add scripts, so we think this matters mainly on multisite, where site Administrators can't.
- Multisite: a site Administrator taking over a Super Admin account. Reported by Yuval Miller. The route is Customizer menu previews. The patch changes how WordPress signs the menu settings it sends to the preview, so that signature can't be confused with one made elsewhere in WordPress. WordPress hasn't explained further.
If you run a network and hand out site Administrator accounts to people you don't know well, update that network first.
Access not stated
WordPress doesn't give an access level for these five. We describe what the patched code now does.
- SQL injection in meta queries. Reported by Christiaan Swiers. A nested
relationvalue inWP_Meta_Querycould reach the database query without being checked. Anything other thanORis now treated asAND. WordPress doesn't build meta queries from visitor input by itself, so we think exposure depends on a plugin or theme passing request data in. - SQL injection through the front page setting. Reported by Rudy Faile. This has the same root as the Customizer preview issue above: a previewed value skipped cleaning, and this one ended up in a database query. The setting now accepts only its two real values, and a batch of
WP_Queryclauses moved to prepared statements. - Reflected cross-site scripting in the legacy media library popup. Reported by Anthropic. WordPress doesn't say which change fixes it. By elimination, we match it to one that stops admin screens from answering REST API requests. "Reflected" means someone logged in has to click a crafted link.
- The Interactivity API's store namespace. Reported by Juliette Reinders Folmer. A helper function that developers call,
wp_interactivity_data_wp_context(), printed the namespace it was given without escaping it. It only matters if a plugin passes it something untrusted. - Openverse image details in the block editor. Reported by Shu Takahashi of Velcore Consulting. When you insert an Openverse image, the editor builds the caption from the title, creator and links in Openverse's catalogue. Those went in as HTML. They're now escaped, and links must start with http or https.
Hardening
- JSON media type matching. Reported by Mo Jangda. A missing backslash in a regular expression turned a hyphen into a range, so the check matched more than it was meant to.
- The Imgur embed is gone from the block editor. Reported by Zhengyu Liu, Jingcheng Yang and Gavin Zhong. WordPress had already removed the server side of it.
One more change isn't a vulnerability. Branches 6.9 and older drop 1024-bit root certificates from the bundle WordPress ships, which 7.0 had already done.
"I'm not on WordPress 7.1. Am I patched?"
Yes, once you take the update for your branch. You don't need to move to 7.1.
Releases for 7.0 down to 6.6 were tagged within seconds of 7.1.5. The ones for 6.5 down to 4.7 followed about two and a half hours later. After 7.1.4, when the documentation listed versions that didn't exist yet, we checked every tag and WordPress's version API this time. All 24 are there.
| Your branch | Affected by | Update to |
|---|---|---|
| 7.1 | 20 of 20 | 7.1.5 |
| 7.0 | 20 of 20 | 7.0.9 |
| 6.9 | 20 of 20 | 6.9.12 |
| 6.8 | 20 of 20 | 6.8.13 |
| 6.7 | 20 of 20 | 6.7.12 |
| 6.6 | 20 of 20 | 6.6.12 |
| 6.5 | 20 of 20 | 6.5.15 |
| 6.4 | 19 of 20 | 6.4.15 |
| 6.3 | 19 of 20 | 6.3.15 |
| 6.2 | 19 of 20 | 6.2.16 |
| 6.1 | 18 of 20 | 6.1.17 |
| 6.0 | 18 of 20 | 6.0.19 |
| 5.9 | 17 of 20 | 5.9.21 |
| 5.8 | 15 of 20 | 5.8.20 |
| 5.7 | 15 of 20 | 5.7.22 |
| 5.6 | 15 of 20 | 5.6.24 |
| 5.5 | 13 of 20 | 5.5.25 |
| 5.4 | 13 of 20 | 5.4.26 |
| 5.3 | 13 of 20 | 5.3.28 |
| 5.2 | 13 of 20 | 5.2.31 |
| 5.1 | 13 of 20 | 5.1.29 |
| 5.0 | 12 of 20 | 5.0.32 |
| 4.9 | 12 of 20 | 4.9.36 |
| 4.8 | 12 of 20 | 4.8.35 |
| 4.7 | 11 of 20 | 4.7.40 |
| 4.6 and earlier | No longer receives security updates | Upgrade |
The "Affected by" counts are WordPress's. We compared them with the list of fixes in each branch's backport commit, and they match on all 24.
Lower counts don't leave a hole
A branch with a lower count doesn't have the code the missing fix changes. The ones we could confirm in the source:
- 6.4 and older skip the Interactivity API fix. That API arrived in 6.5.
- 5.9 and older skip the Comment Date block fix. The block arrived in 6.0.
- 5.5 and older skip the term search and JSON media type fixes. Both pieces of code arrived in 5.6.
- 4.7 skips the embed proxy fix. The proxy arrived in 4.8.
One oddity: 6.0.19 also carries a second commit that backports eight security fixes from 6.9.2 to the 6.0 branch. If you're still on 6.0, that's one more reason to take the update.
WordPress repeats that only the latest version is actively supported and that older branches get fixes as a courtesy. Take the patch, then plan the move.
What to do
- Update now, or confirm it's happened. Sites that take minor updates automatically should already be on 7.1.5 or their branch's patch. Check any site where a plugin or a
wp-config.phpconstant turns those updates off. - Match the version to your branch. Dashboard, then Updates, shows what you're running. The table above shows what you should be running.
- Do multisite networks first. Three of the fixes are aimed at them, and one ends with a Super Admin account.
- Then sites with open registration. A Subscriber account was enough to read commenters' email and IP addresses.
- Turn off XML-RPC if nothing you use needs it. Two of the 20 fixes are in it. If you're not sure what depends on it, ask your host.
- Include staging and development copies. They run the same code as the live site.
If you're on Wordify
Automated Safe Updates applies a security release as soon as it's out, instead of holding it for your update window. The signal comes from WordPress: its version API now marks 7.1.4, and the previous patch on every older branch, as insecure. That's what moves the update to the front of the queue. Sites with it switched on were patched within hours of the release.
Sites on older branches take their own branch's backport, so a site on 7.0 moved to 7.0.9 and a site on 6.7 moved to 6.7.12, with no major upgrade.
Before each update, Wordify takes a verified restore point. After it, Wordify loads the site and compares what comes back with what came back before. If that health check fails, the update is rolled back. Some sites always need a look by hand, and those land on your Tasks page.
Turn the sound on for the voiceover.
Automated Safe Updates is on every plan at no extra cost. Here's how it works.
Common questions
Is WordPress 7.1.5 urgent?
Yes. Update today. Four of the issues need no account, and one of those can lead to remote code execution. WordPress hasn't published any evidence that these are being exploited.
I'm the only user on my site. Does this matter?
Less, but still update. Most of the list needs someone with an account, and if that's only you, most of it can't be used against you. The four unauthenticated issues don't care how many users you have.
There's no CVE. Is it less serious?
No. Nobody has published one yet, and 7.1.4's advisories never got CVE numbers either. Go by what the attacker needs first.
I'm a developer. Will anything break?
Probably not, but three things changed. shortcode_parse_atts() now returns a character reference when a hex or octal escape decodes to <, > or a quote. Customizer settings stored as options now go through sanitize_option() when previewed, not only when saved. And the Imgur variation of the Embed block is gone.
Will WordPress 7.2 have these fixes?
Yes. WordPress says 7.2 Release Candidate 2 came out alongside 7.1.5 with every fix that applies. 7.2 itself is planned for December 8.
The unglamorous point
This is the fifth security release on the 7.1 branch in nine weeks: September 17, September 22, October 6, October 28 and now November 18. That's about one a fortnight.
Nobody we know has time to read 20 sets of patch notes every two weeks, then log in to every site and press the button. And the people looking for unpatched sites don't need to read anything. The diff is public the moment the release is. We've written before about how little time there now is between a fix being published and someone using it.
That's why Automated Safe Updates exists. If you're not sure where your sites stand, talk to us and we'll check them with you.
- WordPress 7.1.4: 22 security fixes, including one in the updater itself, the previous security release.
- WordPress 7.1.3: seven security fixes, and two of them are about comments.
- PHP critical security release, October 2026: what it means for your WordPress site.
- Automated Safe Updates, how Wordify applies security releases like this one.
Sources
- WordPress 7.1.5 Release, wordpress.org, November 18, 2026
- Version 7.1.5, wordpress.org documentation, November 18, 2026
- The 7.1.4 to 7.1.5 diff, WordPress/wordpress-develop on GitHub
- The Gutenberg changes pulled into 7.1.5, WordPress/gutenberg on GitHub
- WordPress core stable-check API, for the patched version of every branch